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INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of citrus fruits, into Florida sometime before
1579,2 citrus production has become a key Florida industry, vital to
the state's economic well-being.3 In a recent news release, the Florida

1. The Florida Citrus Code of 1949 defines citrus fruits to mean "all varieties and regulated
hybrids of citrus fruit and . . . processed citrus products containing 20% or more citrus fruit
or citrus fruit juice [excluding] limes, lemons, marmalade, jellies, preserves, candies, or citrus
hybrids for which no specific standards have been established by the Department of Citrus."
FLA. STAT. § 601.03(7) (1987). Citrus fruits include "grapefruit, oranges, tangerines, Temples,
tangelos, and murcott honey oranges grown in Florida." Id. § 600.041(3).
2. The actual date is unknown. Columbus brought citrus seeds to the Americas in the 15th
century, seeds that were planted throughout the Antilles. J. MCPHEE, ORANGES 89 (1966). In
1518, when Spanish explorer Juan de Grijalva landed in Central America, the first citrus was
planted on the mainland of the Americas. By 1579, Pedro Menendez Marquez reported that
citrus was thriving in the St. Augustine area. THE FLORIDA ALMANAC: 1986-1987 333 (9th
ed. 1986-87) [hereinafter cited as ALMANAC]. The first commercial groves were planted along
the east and west coasts of Florida. The Count Odet Phillipe grove planted in Pinellas County
in the early 19th century is considered to be one of the oldest Florida groves. FLORIDA HANDBOOK: 1987-88 484 (21st ed. 1986-87).
3. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 61 (1915) ("We may take judicial notice of the fact
that the raising of citrus fruits is one of the great industries of the State of Florida."); L. Marcy,
Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 569, 139 So. 121, 128 (1932) ("[T]he citrus industry of Florida is
one of its greatest assets."); Coca-Cola Co., Food v. State, 406 So. 2d 1079, 1086 (1982) ("the
indisputably important role that the citrus industry plays in this state's economy ... ).
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Department of Citrus reports that Florida citrus was valued at $2.7
billion wholesale in 1986-1987, and had a total economic impact of over
seven billion dollars. 4 Florida's 623,568 acres of citrus 5 are spread over
thirty-five of sixty-seven counties.6
The state leads the nation in citrus production - in the 1985-1986
crop year, Florida produced 7,727,000 tons of fruit as compared to
California's 2,974,000 tons, Texas' 23,000 tons, and Arizona's 313,000
tons. 7 Sixty-nine percent of all of the oranges grown in the United
States come from Florida.8 Of the total world production of tangerines
and oranges in 1985-1986, the United States ranks second only to
Brazil. 9 Florida leads the world in grapefruit production with over
ninety percent of the United States-produced grapefruit (2.1 million
metric tons) coming from Florida.10 With the discovery of frozen citrus
concentrate' 1 by researchers at Florida's Department of Citrus in
1943,12 orange juice has become a staple in the American household,
making frozen orange juice concentrate the major orange product of

4. FLORIDA DEPT. OF CITRUS, FACT SHEET (1988). Over 180,000 people work in citrus-related industries. Id.
5. FACT SHEET, supra note 4. In 1970, total commercial citrus acreage in Florida was
941,471. ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 336. The reduction in acreage and citrus production is
attributed to the four tree-killing freezes that hit Florida in the 1980's and citrus-canker problems
in 1984. See infra, notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
6. Counties where citrus is grown commercially include: Alachua, Brevard, Broward, Charlotte, Citrus, Collier, Dade, DeSoto, Flagler, Glades, Hardee, Hendry, Hernando, Highlands,
Hillsborough, Indian River, Lake, Lee, Manatee, Marion, Martin, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola,
Palm Beach, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, Putnam, St. Johns, St. Lucie, Sarasota, Seminole, Sumter
and Volusia. ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 335.
7. FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, CITRUS SUMMARY: 1985-86 5 (Jan. 1987).
8. FACT SHEET, supra note 4.
9. M. BROWN & J. LEE, WORLD ORANGE JUICE TRENDS 11-12 (Jan. 20, 1987).
10. FACT SHEET, supra. note 4. Grapefruit was developed in Florida from a variant that
reached Florida through the Caribbean - the Marsh, Foster and Thompson grapefruits originated in Florida between 1909 and 1930. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, THE
STORY OF FLORIDA CITRUS 2 (1969).
11. Concentrate is manufactured by extractors who extract the juice from the fruit, remove
the water by evaporation, and freeze the remaining concentrate. Reconstituters later reconstitute

the juice by adding water.

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, FROZEN

CONCENTRATED JUICE FROM BRAZIL: DETERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION IN INVESTIGATION No. 731-TA-326 (FINAL) UNDER THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930, TOGETHER WITH THE
INFORMATION OBTAINED IN THE INVESTIGATION 2 (April 1987) [hereinafter cited as TRADE
COMMISSION].

12. In 1942, the Citrus Commission budgeted $5,000 for the development of juice concentrate, and by 1944 concentrate plants began production to fill government orders. FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE FLORIDA CITRUS COMMISSION

25 (1986) [hereinafter cited as FIRST FIFTY YEARS].
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Florida.1 3 The economic importance of the citrus industry to Florida
is evidenced by increased state and federal regulatory involvement,
now concentrated upon the growing threat of foreign imports of frozen
concentrated orange juice. Beginning in 1962, when a severe freeze
greatly reduced Florida citrus production, Brazil's steadily increasing
share of the United States frozen concentrated orange juice market
has been dramatic. Unable to fill the United States demand for orange
juice within the state during periods of freeze, citrus processors have
looked to Brazil for plentiful supplies of lower-priced concentrate.
Although the availability of imported concentrate in times of scarcity has helped maintain a domestic orange juice market in the United
States, the short term economic benefits flowing to processors from
the foreign supply have not been enjoyed by Florida growers. This
division in the industry has made protection and control more complicated. While Brazilian concentrate exporters are eager to maintain
and increase their United States market share, the goal of the Florida
citrus industry as a whole, including both growers and processors, is
to use the foreign imports strictly as supplementary to the Florida
supply.
This note will examine the immediate threat that Brazil poses to
the industry 14 and the potential threats of Mexico and the Caribbean
Basin. 15 Conversely, the benefits of foreign imports to the Florida
citrus industry will be examined. Finally, measures that have been
taken to limit the impact of foreign competition will be surveyed. The
focus will be on imported frozen concentrated orange juice.16

13. About 92% of Florida's 1986-1987 juice orange crop was processed. USDA OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, USDA PRESS RELEASE 1 (Dec. 10, 1987). Retail orange
juice sales for the 1986-1987 season were 858 million SSE (single strength equivalency) gallons,

at a season average price of $3.34 per SSE gallon. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, FLORIDA
CITRUS OUTLOOK UPDATE 1987-88 SEASON Table 3 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter cited at CITRUS
OUTLOOK].

14. Brazil has become Florida's number one competitor in the orange juice concentrate
market. See infra notes 49-63, and accompanying text.
15. "Mexico and the Caribbean Basin Region are not strong competitors at this time and
we do not expect that situation to change in the near future." Letter from Catherine A. Clay,
Florida Department of Citrus Information Specialist (June 16, 1988). Although exports from
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin Region do not currently threaten the Florida citrus industry,
these two regions will be analyzed as potential rivals.
16. In his testimony before the Committee on Agriculture concerning the impact of imports
on the United States fruit and vegetable industry, Bobby McKown, Executive Vice President
of Florida Citrus Mutual, a voluntary cooperative group consisting of more than 12,134 growers,
similarly narrowed his focus to imported orange juice, stating:
Since more than 70% of Florida's orange production is channeled directly into
orange juice, and the International Trade Commission has determined that orange
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EARLY REGULATION

Regulation and protection of the fledgling industry and the citrus
consumer began early, with an 1846 resolution by the Florida Senate
and House of Representatives to study the prevention of orange tree
diseases,17 a 1911 law to prevent the sale and shipping of immature
citrus fruit,18 and a 1913 law setting up citrus maturity standards and
providing for the appointment of state citrus inspectors.19 In an act
passed in 192520 the legislature provided specific guidelines for citrus
inspection, and established a one-and-one-half cents per box fee to be
paid to the Commissioner of Agriculture, with fines or imprisonment
meted out to violators.21 Laws enacted in 1927 and 1929 regulated the
use of arsenic as a pesticide for citrus fruit, 22 and protection of the
industry against the economic consequences of a freeze was instituted
in 1927 when the legislature enacted a law permitting a joint declaration of a state of emergency following a freeze by the Commissioner
of Agriculture and the Governor.Finally, in 1935, in an attempt to bring some centralized order to
a citrus industry consisting of "disorganized individualists,"-' the
Florida legislature enacted a series of laws aimed primarily at governing the growing industry. 2 These laws established the Florida Citrus
Commission,- a board composed of "12 practical citrus fruit men"
within the Department of Citrus,- to "protect the public health and

growers and orange juice processors comprise a single industry producing orange
juice as its primary commercial product, it is appropriate to examine imports of
orange juice as an illustration of the impact of increasing fruit and vegetable imports
on industry.
Testimony of Bobby F. McKown before the Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer
Relations, and Nutrition, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (May 10,
1988) [hereinafter cited as McKowN TESTIMONY].
17. 1846 Fla. Laws, Resolution No. 33.
18. Immature Citrus Fruit Law, Ch. 6236, 1911 Fla. Laws 205.
19. Ch. 6515, 1913 Fla. Laws 375.
20. Ch. 10103, 1925 Fla. Laws 162.
21. Id. §§ 5, 11, 1925 Fla. Laws at 164, 166.
22. Ch. 11844, 1927 Fla. Laws 172; Ch. 14485, 1929 Fla. Laws 937.
23. Ch. 11876, 1927 Fla. Laws 374.
24. FIRST FIFTY YEARS, supra note 12, at preface.
25. Remarkable industry growth was evident by as early at 1935. Figures show that the
1886-1887 crop year yielded 1,260,000 boxes of fruit; by 1919-1920, boxes totaled 13,928,000,
and by 1933-1934, growers produced 28,812,000 boxes. FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS,
CITRUS SUMMARY 1985-86 4 (Jan. 1987).

26.
27.

Ch. 16854, 1935 Fla. Laws 213.
FLA. STAT. § 601.04(1)(a) (1987).
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welfare and to stabilize and protect the citrus industry of the state
of Florida. '" In 1949, all citrus laws were repealed and replaced by
the Florida Citrus Code of 1949.- The new 1949 Code instituted few
real changes from the 1935 laws, but additions to the Code over the
last thirty-five years have created protective provisions 3° and specific
standards, 3 1 making the Florida Citrus Code a powerful tool in nurturing, sheltering and regulating the citrus industry.
Protection and promotion of the citrus industry has been long upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police power.3 2 In a recent
decision upholding a required designation of origin for Florida grown
grapefruit, the Florida Supreme Court stated that,
If Citrus is not identified as being of Florida origin, then
the money spent encouraging consumers to buy Florida citrus will be for naught. Those consumers favorably impressed
with [the Department of Citrus'] advertising campaign will

28. Ch. 16854, § La, 1935 Fla. Laws 213.
29. Ch. 25149, 1949 Fla. Laws 281.
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 601.091 (1987) (setting the boundaries for the Indian River
production area to protect Indian River fruit by prohibiting those outside the area from falsely
labeling their fruit "Indian River"); id. § 601.13 (providing for on-going citrus research); id. §
601.15 (giving the Department of Citrus broad powers to promote and advertise Florida citrus
and to collect an excise tax on each box of citrus moved through commercial channels); id. §
601.154(3)(a). The Citrus Stabilization Act of Florida allows the Citrus Commission to issue with
proper notice any marketing order that will have the following effects:
1. Return to producers of oranges, grapefruit, tangerines, or citrus hybrids
in Florida at least average cost of production.
2. Prevent the unreasonable or unnecessary waste of the wealth of the orange,
grapefruit, tangerine, or citrus hybrid industry and of the economy of the state.
3. Protect the interests of consumers of oranges, grapefruit, tangerines, or
citrus hybrids and the products thereof.
Id. § 601.155 (an equalizing excise tax that is required of "the first person who exercises in
this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange . . .
or grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging [the same] into retail or
institutional size containers. .. ").
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 601.16-.18 (1987) (setting up detailed standards for maturity,
minimum ratios of solids to acid and minimum juice content for grapefruit); Id. §§ 601.19-.20
(1987) (standards for orange maturity and minimum ratios of solids to acid).
32. See, e.g., Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) (upholding a 1911 Florida statute
forbidding the sale or shipment of immature citrus fruit); Snively Groves, Inc. v. Florida Citrus
Comm'n, 23 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Fla. 1938) (upholding a regulation setting standards for citrus
fruit containers); C.V. Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus Comm'n, 128 Fla. 656, 175 So. 248
(1937) (upholding an advertising tax on citrus); Flake v. State Dept. of Agric., 383 So. 2d 285
(Fla. 5th. D.C.A. 1980) (allowed quarantine of suspected diseased fruit trees); Coca-Cola Co.,
v. State, 406 So. 2d 1079 (1982) (upholding a rule requiring declaration of state origin on
grapefruit products grown and processed in the state).
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be unable to determine which citrus is from Florida, and
will be just as likely to purchase grapefruit from California,
Arizona, Mexico, Brazil, etc., as from this state. The increasingly stiff competition facing our state from other citrus producing locales justifies this measure intended to promote
3
consumption of Florida citrus.M
Thus, the Florida Citrus Code, born out of police power 34 and case
law-M gives the legislature enormous discretion in applying the Code
and acts as a buffer, protecting the valuable citrus industry.
Unfortunately for Florida growers, however, the legislature has
never been able to legislate the Florida weather. While the State of
Florida can regulate the sale and use of freeze-damaged fruit, 36 and
can control canker infestation, foreign competition arising from shortages in Florida citrus production due to freezes and disease are proving
much harder to combat. Between 1980 and 1986, a succession of serious
freezes destroyed 400,000 acres of citrus trees.3 7 The freezes occurred
in the 1980/81, 1981/82, 1983/4, and 1984/85 crop years,38 causing a 39
percent decrease in Florida's orange juice production between 19791980 and 1986-19872 The first three freezes of the 1980's caused major
orange loss, and weakened the trees; the 1984/85 freeze, considered
the worst freeze of the century, 40 hit the already weakened trees hard,
devastating thousands of acres of citrus.41 There was a 35 percent

33. Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 406 So. 2d 1079, 1082-1083 (1982) (emphasis in original).
34. FLA. STAT. § 601.02(1) (1987). The purpose of the Code is stated: "[in the exercise of
the police power to protect health and welfare and to stabilize and protect the citrus industry
of the state."
35. See supra note 32.
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 601.89-.901 (1987).
37. Adams, Orlando Lab Puts Freeze Squeeze on Florida Citrus Problems, 36 AGRIC.

RES. 6 (Jan., 1988).
38. A crop year in Florida is from December 1 through November 30. TRADE COMMISSION,
supra note 11, at 17.
39. Adams, supra note 37, at 7.
40. University of Florida Professor Peter Waylen analyzed meteorological data, and concluded that severe frosts hit Florida about every twenty-two years - the state's five worst
freezes occurred in 1895, 1917, 1940, 1962, and 1985. A 22-Year Cycle of Killer Frosts, FLORIDA
TREND, Mar., 1988, at 61. Citrus damage occurs when temperatures drop below twenty-eight
degrees Fahrenheit (280) for six hours or longer. Miami Herald, Dec. 26, 1983, at 1A, col. 3.
41. FIRST FIFTY YEARS, supra note 12, at 408. The freeze struck January 21-23, 1985.
By January 24th., the Commission had ordered a seven day embargo on the sale and processing
of citrus followed by a 14 day shipping ban on freeze damaged fruit. Miami Herald, Jan. 25,
1985, at 1A, col. 2.
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decline in total Florida bearing acreage from the 1982/83 to 1985/86
seasons due directly to the tree killing frosts.4
The recurrent freezes prompted many citrus growers in northern
sections of Florida to migrate to the south; others, betting that the
freezes had come to a temporary halt, began the laborious job of
replanting.- Replanting was made even more difficult by the next
citrus disaster to hit Florida - citrus canker. The bacterial disease
was first discovered in 1984 in an Avon Park, Florida, nursery;- in
1986, the disease was reported on mature trees in the St. Petersburg
area.- Citrus canker is a highly contagious citrus tree disease that
can be eradicated only through destruction of all infected or exposed
plants. By 1986, when many growers were working to replant groves
destroyed by the cold, over twenty million seedlings infected by the
canker had been burned. 46 This greatly slowed the replanting effort,
and prevented the industry from achieving a fast come-back. Newly
planted groves take from three to five years to begin producing, and
full production is not reached until at least seven to ten years after
the seedlings are planted. 47 In the spring of 1987, with the first mild
winter in four years behind them and citrus canker under control,
hopeful citrus growers hastened to replant.4
III.

BRAZIL AND THE FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY

Reduction of the domestic orange crop due to freezes and canker,
49
coupled with an increase in United States orange juice consumption,
resulted in United States growers being unable to fill the demand for
orange juice with Florida fruit. Therefore, United States processorsw°
reached out to other countries for the concentrate they needed. 51 The
main source for the orange juice that the stricken Florida citrus industry could not provide was Brazil.

42.
43.
44.

TRADE COMMISSION,

45.
46.

Winsberg, The Changing FloridaOrange Industry, Focus, Winter, 1986, at 30.
Id.
Daniels, supra note 43; Berman, Orange Crush, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1986, at 50.
Florida Citrus Growers Ready to Expand, J. CoM, Mar. 18, 1987, 12A, col. 5.

47.
48.

supra note 11, at R-33, table 10.
Daniels, The Legacy of a Citrus Freeze, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1985, at 37, col. 1.
Desperate Measures in Florida, TIME, Sept. 30, 1985, at 67.

49. Letter from Catherine Clay, supra note 15.
50. Processors, or extractor-processors, are firms that extract and concentrate orange juice
from U.S. oranges when U.S. oranges are available. Firms that import or purchase concentrate
for blending, reconstitution or remanufacture are called reconstitutors or purchaser-processors.
TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 11, at R-17.
51. Letter from Catherine A. Clay, supra note 15. In 1985, Florida could provide only 50%
of all United States consumed orange juice. Id.
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Brazil, now the world's leading producer of orange juice concentrate, got its start exporting frozen concentrate less than thirty years
ago after the disastrous Florida freeze of 1962.52 In 1961, Brazil's
exports of concentrate totaled only one ton;-, during the first eight
M estimates are that Brazil exported
months of the 1987/88 season,about
190 million forty-two degree (420) Brix-M gallons of frozen concentrated
orange juice,- over 90 percent of the total world's exports of concentrate. 57 From the 1980/81 season through the 1986/87 season, Brazil's
percentage of the total United States retail orange juice market
jumped from 19 percent to nearly 44 percent.M Clearly, Brazil has
seized the opportunity to dominate the valuable United States orange
juice market. Brazil has made enormous strides in capturing other
overseas markets as well: in 1984, the European Economic Community
imported 273,261,900 SSE 59 gallons of frozen concentrated orange juice
from Brazil compared with only 19,848,700 SSE gallons from the
United States. 6° Brazilian producers have recently entered into an
agreement with the USSR state agricultural committee Gosagroprom
to export orange juice concentrate into the Soviet Union,6 1 and the
Brazilian Association of Citrus Juice Manufacturers is negotiating with
an Italian association in an attempt to open another new market to
Brazilian orange concentrate exporters in Italy.2 With predictions of
increased production from both Florida and Brazil, the long-term outlook is for a combined Brazilian-Floridian production increase of almost
40 percent by the year 2000. 63 Competition for new markets for orange
juice will be keen as supplies increase. Expanded acreage and improved technology could lead to a serious orange juice glut unless
Florida and Brazil work together to increase world markets instead
of battling over existing ones.
52. Whitefield, Orange Wars, Miami Herald, June 7, 1987, at 2F, col. 5.
53. Id.
54. The Brazilian crop year is from July 1 through June 30; the United States crop year
is from December 1 through November 30. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 11, at R-99.
55. The Brix value is the amount of sugar expressed in percent by weight of solids. A Brix
degree is a measurement unit for the amount of concentration of fruit juices. Id. at R-13.
56. CITRUS OUTLOOK, supra note 13, at 2.
57. Cohen, Citrus King: Brazil's Jose Cutrale, Helped by Coca-Cola, Is Taking on Florida,
Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 6.

58.. McKOWN

TESTIMONY,

supra note 16, at 2.

59. Single strength equivalency.
60. M. BROWN & J. LEE, supra note 9, at Table 9.
61. Charters, Vodka Awaits Brazil's Oranges, Financial Times of London, Sept. 25, 1987,
as cited in ISLA, #1723, at 316.
62. Turner, Brazil in Italian Orange Juice Venture, Financial Times of London, Oct. 29,
1987, as cited in ISLA, #2302, at 361.
63. Koenig, The Big Thaw in Citrus, FLORIDA TREND, Mar., 1988, at 58.
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The meteoric rise of Brazil's frozen concentrate industry has been
aided by government commitment to strengthen Brazil's returns in
the international marketplace. As the Third World's largest debtor
nation, Brazil has struggled under the burden of servicing its huge
foreign debt. Brazil's foreign debt, approximately $110 billion in total
loans,r has played a key role in determining its foreign trade policy.
Before 1984, when export subsidies were greatly decreased, grower
and processor subsidies and other strong export incentives, coupled
with strict import controls, were used by the Brazilian government
to boost exports in an attempt to improve the balance of payments.6
Other methods used to assist citrus growers included price control,
subsidized credit, interest-free loans for the purchase of fertilizer and
low interest rates for other production expenses.6 7 Assistance to processors included duty-free imports of equipment for citrus processing
plants and subsidized credit for new factory equipment.6 Another
powerful government control was the issuance of export licenses by
the Foreign Trade Department of the Bank of Brazil. Shippers of juice
concentrate had to have an export license for each shipment that left
Brazil, giving the government some measure of control over the exported product.6 In 1979, in an attempt to slow Brazil's runaway
inflation rate, former President Figueiredo removed many of the export incentives, and devalued the cruzeiro by 30 percent. 70 Tax credits
were eliminated in December of 1979 to conform to GATT standards, 71
but were reinstituted from 1981 to 1984.72
In 1985, after twenty-one years of military rule, Brazil returned
to a democratic government headed by President Jos6 Sarney.- High
hopes for the new government have disintegrated in the face of a 600

64. Blustein, Brazil's High-Stakes Debt Talks: Throwing Good Money After Bad?,
Washington Post, May 24, 1988, at C1, col. 3.
65. Id.
66. UNITED NATIONS, TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES
47 (1985).

67.
1980).

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, BRAZIL'S ORANGE JUICE INDUSTRY

13 (Apr.,

68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 15.
70. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, BRAZIL: AGRICULTURE AND TRADE
POLICIES 9 (1981).
71. Id. at 10. Brazil joined GATT in 1948. In accord with the GATT Subsidy Code, Brazil
agreed to eliminate the subsidized tax credit program that had been in place since 1969. Final
expiration date was June 30, 1983, but Brazil voluntarily abolished the tax credit program in
1979. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 66, at 55.
72. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 66, at 55-6.
73. Riding, Ailing Brazil is Divided on Economy, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1988, at D8, col. 1.
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percent annual inflation rate, rising unemployment, growth at under
2 percent, and allegations of corruption in the Sarney administration. 74
A general price freeze introduced in February of 1986 as part of the
Cruzado Plan temporarily slowed Brazil's inflation, but a concurrent
rise in the minimum wage led to an unrestrained increase in consumer
spending. At the same time, government spending escalated. 75 Store
inventories were quickly depleted by waves of shoppers intent on
taking advantage of the frozen prices and the 23 percent increase in
disposable income. Since scarce items could be found on a black market
uncontrolled by the government price freeze, the Cruzado Plan did
not have the desired effect, and by the end of 1986 inflation began to
rise. 76
When President Sarney imposed a moratorium on foreign debt
repayment in February of 1987, funds and credit lines were withdrawn
by the stunned international lending community, causing great
hardship in Brazil. Recent steps to end the moratorium, virtual elimination of required export licenses and subsidies, and reduced import
tariffs, are encouraging signs that Brazil is trying to pull itself out of
an enconomic quagmire. 77 Brazil's newest approach to reducing the
staggering interest rates on its loans was finalized in June of 1988 in exchange for payment of overdue interest from March, April, and
May, foreign creditor banks will reduce the interest rate they have
been charging on Brazil's medium-term loans, and will provide new
loans. It is hoped that the lower interest on certain of its loans will
7
permit Brazil to meet its interest payments on all of its debt.
Thus, the rapid development of the Brazilian citrus industry must
be viewed against a back-drop of export expansion born of the need
for foreign exchange earnings 79 to service a huge foreign debt in a
time of deep economic recession and political change. Heavy investment in the industry has paid off for Brazil, s° rocketing it from its

74. Bridges, Brazil's Bittersweet Democracy, Christian Science Monitor, May 25, 1988, at
7, col. 3.
75. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, BRAZILIAN CITRUS SITUATION AND OUTLOOK:
1986-87 AND 1987-88 SEASONS 3 (May 19, 1987).
76. Id. Brazil's inflation rate dropped from 235.1% in 1985 to 62.4% in 1986 when the
Cruzado Plan was first instituted. By 1987, however, inflation had soared to 400%. Id. at Figure 2.
77. Blustein, supra note 64, at C5, col. 3.
78. Berg, Brazil Debt Pact Called Innovative, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1988, at D9, col. 2.
79. In 1986, Brazil earned $352.3 million in foreign exchange monies from citrus concentrate
alone. Bruce, High-Tech System Speeds Brazilian Exports of O.J., J. COM., Mar. 24, 1987, at
8A, col. 1.
80. By 1987, over $1.5 billion had been invested in orange processing factories in Sao Paulo
State, Brazil's major producing region. Cohen, supra note 57, at 1, col. 6.
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meager beginnings in the early 1960's to its undisputed place as the
world's largest orange concentrate producer. Brazil is a formidable
competitor with the Florida citrus industry, both inside the United
States and in outside world markets. With cheaper land and labor
costs, plus a favorable frost-free climate, Brazil has an impressive
initial edge. Added to that is Brazil's citrus technology, modeled after
the Florida industry, which the Florida Department of Citrus terms
"state-of-the-art."sl Brazil's bulk tanker system for shipping frozen
orange juice concentrate was originated by Cargill Agricola, a major
Brazilian processor-exporter of concentrate. The two leading Brazilian
processor-exporters of concentrate, Citrosuco Paulista S.A. and
Sucocitrico Cutrale S.A.,8 lease from a fleet of six tanker ships3 with
an annual shipping capacity of about 650,000 metric tons. Refrigerated and pressurized tanker trucks transport concentrate from the
processing plants' storage tanks to dock-side tanks in Santos, Brazil's
largest port, or Guaruja. Orange juice pipelines link the storage tanks
to the tanker ships. Computerized loading and unloading of concentrate
directly into tanks as opposed to traditional shipment in barrels saves
both time and money. Concentrate is loaded into the refrigerated holds
of tanker ships, then unloaded in the United States and Europe in
terminals similar to those in Brazil, and operated by Brazilian exporters . 5
Brazil's sophisticated transport system, ultra-modern orange juice
processing plants, and enormous tank farm storage capacity in the
United States and in Europe,8 are all factors that have helped catapult
Brazil to the forefront of the frozen concentrate market. Despite a
variety of measures taken by both federal and state governments in
the United States to reduce the impact of Brazil's exported concentrate,8 7 Brazilian orange juice processing costs continue to undercut
Florida's costs. Executive Vice President of Florida Citrus Mutual,
Bobby F. McKown, points to the importance of higher production per
acre in Florida to compete against the Brazilian orange juice
superstructure. 9 The 1987/88 season was a disappointing one for Brazil,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
States
at 2.
87.
88.
89.

supra note 75, at 1.
Whitefield, supra note 52, at 2F, col. 5.
Bruce, supra note 79, at 8A, col. 1.
BRAZILIAN CITRUS SITUATION, supra note 75, at 2.
Bruce, supra note 79, at 8A, col. 2.
The Florida Department of Citrus estimates that Brazil's storage capacity in the United
and Europe is over 90,000 metric tons. BRAZILIAN CITRUS SITUATION, supra note 75,
BRAZILIAN CITRUS SITUATION,

See infra notes 146-172, and accompanying text.
McKOWN TESTIMONY, supra note 16, at 4-5.
Koenig, supra note 63, at 60.
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with twenty to forty million boxes of oranges less than predicted. 9° A
drought hit Brazil in July, August and September of 1987, resulting
in smaller-sized fruit, and a lower yield. Poor grove care, due to lower
profit margins and supply shortages the past two years, led to heavier
fruit droppage. 91 Some of the benefits reaped by Brazil during the
early to mid-eighties will now go to Florida growers, as Brazilian
shortfalls push the price of oranges up almost eighty percent. 92 This
temporary windfall is good news for Florida growers whose groves
survived the bad freeze years, but long range estimates by the Department of Citrus show that Brazilian orange production could increase
to almost three hundred million boxes by 1996/97. .1
IV.

MEXICO AND THE FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY

Although Mexico supplied about 70 percent of all fresh citrus imports into the United States in the late 1970's and early 1980's, Mexican
exports of orange juice have been minimal. In 1985, Brazil supplied
96.7 percent of the total United States' imports of frozen concentrated
orange juice. Of the remaining 3.3 percent, 48 percent of the United
States' imports came from Mexico in 1985, down from 95 percent in
1983.94 The drop reflects freezes, canker, and United States' restrictions on imports of EDB-contaminated fruit that reduced the Mexican
orange crop between 1983 and 1985. 95 Before the 1983 freeze, Mexican
orange juice processors, realizing the potential in exported concentrate, made substantial investments in orange juice plants, investments that they hope will begin to pay off as production increases.Mexican processors feel confident that they have two key advantages
over the Brazilians in orange juice production - Mexican juice reportedly has a better color and higher Brix ratio and Mexico is in closer
proximity to western United States markets. Mexico also benefits
from low labor costs and relatively inexpensive land. Unlike Brazil,
however, Mexico depends more heavily on imported technologies for

90.

Brazil's orange production for the 1987-88 season, originally estimated to be somewhere

between 240 to 260 million boxes, remained the same as the year before at 220 million boxes.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, BRAZILIAN CITRUS SITUATION AND OUTLOOK: 1987-88
& 1988-89 SEASONS 1 (May 11, 1988).
91. Id. at 1.
92. Koenig, supra note 63, at 60.
93. M. BROWN & J. LEE, supra note 9, at 25.
94. Id. at 12-13.

95.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERV-

ICE, CITRUS, MEXICO 1 (Dec.

96.

2, 1987).

Id.
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citrus production 97 and has a growing domestic market that demands
much of the juice that would otherwise be exported.- Processors have
aimed towards developing this domestic market due to its relative
price stability as opposed to the wildly unpredictable world market.
Like Brazil, Mexico has been battling against a huge foreign debt,
$105.3 billion, and a high annual inflation rate, 159.2 percent at the
end of December, 1987. 99 Because of a perceived need to cut imports
and boost exports to provide foreign currency reserves to meet payments on the foreign debt, Mexico has used both direct and indirect
subsidies ranging from tax exemptions to below-market interest rates.
Mexico entrenchment in trade nationalism, with its emphasis on limited
imports and subsidized exports, may be giving way in the face of a
recent United States-Mexican "understanding" signed in November of
1987.100 The two countries have embarked upon more liberalized bilateral trade relations in establishing trade dispute mechanisms, and in
opening both markets to increased trade.101
Mexico's tactics to reduce inflation and cut its foreign debt have
had mixed results. In December of 1987, Mexico adopted an anti-inflationary program, the Economic Solidarity Pact [Pact] that has as
its goal a 1 to 2 percent monthly inflation rate by the end of 1988.1°
Much of the Pact reflects the increased emphasis on trade liberalization
that is evident in the United States-Mexican "understanding"; specifically increased imports, limited wage demands by labor, and reduced
governmental spending. The Pact, initiated by the de la Madrid administration, will be adhered to by the newly elected President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari in hopes that it will help lead the country out of
economic depression. A freeze on prices of government-controlled
items, wages and the monetary exchange rate, in conjunction with
the Pact's other inflationary measures, have resulted in lower inflation
in February, March, and April of 1988.103

97.

S.

SANDERSON,

THE TRANSFORMATION OF MEXICAN AGRICULTURE:

INTERNA-

57 (1986).
98. CITRUS IN MEXICO, supra note 95, at 1. Twenty-five to 30% of the frozen concentrated
orange juice output is absorbed by the domestic market. Id. at 27.
99. Whitefield, Mexico's Dragon: Roaring Inflation, Miami Herald, Apr. 18, 1988, Business
Monday, at 17, col. 1.
100. Orme, U.S.-Mexican 'Understanding'Seen as Sign of Economic Integration,J. COM.,
May 16, 1988, as cited in ISLA, #3026, at 24.
101. Id.
102. Rubio, Mexico Takes On Inflation, J. COM., Mar. 2, 1988, at 8A, col. 1.
103. Mexico Will Extend Freeze on Prices Through August, Wall St. J., May 24, 1988, at
35, col. 1.
TIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE POLITICS OF RURAL CHANGE
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Less successful has been the Mexican debt-for-bond trade aimed
at reducing the foreign debt. Although early reports of the innovative
plan hailed it a "qualified success,"1° later analysis revealed that there
was only a $1.1 billion reduction where over $10 billion had been
anticipated.°5 The plan involved offering commercial banks a trade their Mexican debt holdings in exchange for twenty-year zero-coupon
bonds issued by Mexico and backed by United States Government
Treasury bonds. After the disappointing results of the debt-for-bond
swap, Mexico began work on other debt reduction methods which it
plans to present to banks sometime in late 1988. President Salinas
proposes a firm negotiation stance towards cutting the debt principal
to reduce interest payments.' ° Like other Latin American debtors, 1°7
however, Mexico continues to struggle in the absence of significant
and successful debt relief.
How the developing Mexican frozen concentrate industry will be
affected by Mexican trade liberalization and other tactics newly elected
President de Gortari may take remains to be seen. In 1987, Mexican
foreign currency reserves doubled to $13.7 billion, boosted largely by°
a private export drive, and the private sector trade surplus tripled. 0
Private manufacturer's export earnings rose 39 percent. Even without
Mexican subsidization, there are profits to be made. However, with
an increasing domestic market in orange juice, and an uncertain foreign
market, Mexican orange processors are likely to pass up the temptation
to compete head-on with Brazil for the lucrative United States' market,
and concentrate largely on internal demand.
V.

THE

CARIBBEAN

BASIN INITIATIVE
CITRUS INDUSTRY

AND

THE

FLORIDA

Under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act [hereinafter
Act], signed by President Reagan on August 5, 1983,' °9 new trade and

104. Truell, Mexico's Plan to Lower Debt Seems a Success, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1988, at
2, col. 2.
105. Bennett, Lesson on Mexican Debt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1988, at 35, col. 1.
106. Truell & Moffett, Mexico Works on Less-Ambitious Plans with J.P. Morgan to Cut
Foreign Debt, Wall St. J., May 25, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
107. Latin American debtor nations include Brazil ($113 billion), Mexico ($108 billion),
Argentina ($54 billion), Venezuela ($32 billion), Chile ($20 billion), Columbia ($16 billion), and
Peru ($15 billion). Riding, For Latin America, Its the Decade of Unsupportable Debt, N.Y.

Times, Mar. 6, 1988, at 2E, col. 2, quoting U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean.
108. Orme, Jr., Mexico's Exporters Thrived Last Year, J. CoM., Apr. 29, 1988, at 7A, col. 5.
109. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98 67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as CBI].
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tax measures were instituted to provide expanded opportunites in the
Caribbean Basin Region.1 ° The Reagan administration hoped that by
eliminating United States tariffs on most Caribbean Basin exports to
the United States, the resulting increase in economic productivity
would help pull the Caribbean nations out of massive economic difficulties that included high inflation, declining growth and rising unemployment. 1 An initial $350 million aid package, plus duty free exports,
and a tourism incentive provision to allow for tax deductions of business conventions held in the region were predicted to provide the
Caribbean Basin Intiative [hereinafter CBI] beneficiaries the tools
with which to overcome their economic problems." 2 However, because
the CBI has had disappointing results for most of its intended beneficiaries,1 1 3 the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on
Ways and Means began hearings at the end of 1987 on a proposed
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1987. 114
Florida's agricultural sector has strongly opposed the proposed
changes out of fear that Florida farmers will be faced with the strong
competition of Caribbean nations having increased access to United
15
States' markets. 1

110. The twenty-seven developing countries under the protective umbrella of the Act include: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Christopher Nevis, Turks
and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands. Id. § 212(b).
111. H. ERISMAN, Contemporary Challenges Confronting U.S. CaribbeanPolicy, in THE
11-3 (1984).
112. In President Reagan's 1982 message to Congress concerning the proposed Caribbean
Basin Initiative, he stated:
[A] key principle of the program is to encourage a more productive, competitive
and dynamic private sector, and thereby provide the jobs, goods and services which
the people of the Basin need for a better life for themselves and their children.
All the elements of this program are designed to help establish the conditions
under which a free and competitive private sector can flourish.
President's Message to Congress on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 323, 326 (Mar. 22, 1982). But see H. ERISMAN, supra note 111, at 15-6, arguing that the
real motive behind the CBI was to promote private U.S. investment and to assist the U.S.
business community with favorable trade policies from the beneficiary nations.
113. Trade between the United States and the beneficiaries has actually decreased since
the Act went into effect in 1983 - from $14.2 billion in 1983 to $12 billion in 1986. Bill Would
Improve CaribbeanBasin Plan, J. COM., Sept. 28, 1987, as cited in ISLA, #555, at 229.
114. Panel to Study CaribbeanBasin Act, J. COM., Dec. 9, 1987, at 5A, col. 3.
115. Rachid, U.S. Opposition Grows to CaribbeanAid Bill, J. COM., Sept. 1, 1987, at 4A,
col. 2.
CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE: U.S. POLICY
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Current argicultural opposition to the proposed changes is not surprising given the fact that resistance to the initial CBI by Florida
citrus growers was strong. 116 The CBI has as its nucleus a one-way
free trade program scheduled to last twelve years (until September
30, 1995) for certain goods produced by eligible beneficiaries." 7 Goods
excluded from the duty-free treatment include textiles and apparel,
footwear and other leather goods, canned tuna, petroleum and petroleum products, and watches with parts from certain communist countries. 1 18 The 1987 proposed changes would expand the duty-free treatment to include some of the products that the CBI excludes."1 One
of the major provisions of the CBI is the rule of origin requirements
that eligible products must meet in order to qualify for duty-free
treatment. 2 0 Eligibility under the Act requires that the article be
21
grown, produced or manufactured in a beneficiary country.' It must
also be imported directly from a beneficiary country,' = have a cost or
value of at least 35 percent local content,'2 and must be either wholly
grown, produced or manufactured by a beneficiary or have undergone
a substantial transformation that has created "a new or different article
of commerce."'- To help protect the domestic citrus industry from the
reconstituting of Brazilian frozen concentrated orange juice in the
Basin to avoid the United States tariff, the Act states, "no article or
material of a beneficiary country shall be eligible for such treatment
by virtue of having merely undergone - (A) simple combining or
packaging operations, or (B) mere dilution with water or mere dilution
with another substance that does not materially alter the characteristics of the article. . . .

116. See Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings on S. 2237 Before the Subcommittee on Trade
of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 189-190 (1982). (Bobby F.
McKown, Florida Citrus Mutual, spoke to Chairman Gibbons of the concerns of Florida citrus
growers that the Caribbean Basin Initiative would allow non-CBI beneficiaries, notably Brazil,
to funnel frozen concentrate through the Caribbean Basin, avoiding the U.S. tariff on orange
juice.)
117. CBI, supra note 109, §§ 211, 212(b), 213, 218(b).
118. Id. § 213(b)(1-5).
119. Whitefield, Trade ProposalMay Sweeten For Caribbean:Congress Considers Broadening Initiative, Miami Herald, Oct. 26, 1987, Business Monday, at 18, col. 4.
120. CBI, supra note 109, § 213(a)(1-3).
121. Id. § 213(a)(1).
122. Id. § 213(a)(1)(A).
123. Id. § 213(a)(1)(B). However, United States manufactured materials may contribute
15% of the required 35%, leaving only 20% direct cost of processing to be supplied by the
benficiary. Id. § 213(a)(1)(B)(ii).
124. Id. § 213(a)(2).
125. Id.
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Despite the existence of safeguards in the CBI that should act to
protect the Florida citrus industry, growers are worried about the
potential impact of the present Act 126 and the proposed changes that
would expand and extend the program to the year 2007. Industry
concerns include fears that:
1. Brazil will attempt to by-pass the United States tariff
on orange juice by going through the region;
2. Caribbean Basin citrus production will increase to
the point of being a real competitive threat;
3. United States' investors beginning or relocating citrus operations in CBI countries will be able to compete directly against Florida growers; and
imports will carry dis4. Caribbean Basin agricultural
2
ease and insects into Florida.1 7
So far these concerns have proven groundless. Trade has not increased
as expected; in fact, only six of the twenty-seven beneficiary nations
reported any increase in the value of their United States exports in
12
1987, and those increases were due largely to garment exports. 8
United States orange juice imports from CBI countries did increase
from pre-duty-free market amounts ranging from zero to 2.475 million
SSE gallons to 5.4 million SSE gallons in the first ten months of
1984-85,m9 but compared with Brazil's 1984-85 exports of 246.5 million
gallons, the present Caribbean Basin threat is minimal. Although there
has been some initial United States private investment in the area,
development of citrus groves is a long-term project, and the current
1995 cut-off date is discouraging to American growers looking at eight
to ten years before trees reach full productivity.
One example of corporate vascillation in the face of resistance by
environmentalists and problems encountered with planting citrus in
the Caribbean Basin is the experience of the Coca-Cola Foods Division,
Inc., makers of Minute Maid citrus products. In 1985, Coca-Cola an-

126. For interesting overviews of the feared competitive threat of CBI imports, see
Polopolus, The CaribbeanBasin Initiative and its Potential Impact Upon Agriculture in South
Florida, FOOD AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT STAFF PAPER 285 (Aug., 1985);
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE AND THE FLORIDA
CITRUS INDUSTRY

(Oct., 1985).

127. Id.
128. James, U.S. Imports From CaribbeanRemain at StagnantLevels, J. CoM., Apr. 15,
1988, at 4A, col. 4.

129.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE AND THE

FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY,

supra note 126, at 30.
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nounced plans to plant 25,000 acres of citrus in Belize.130 The corporation purchased over 700,000 acres of land from Belize Estate and
Produce Co., Ltd., the largest orange juice exporter of all the CBI
countries, and it projected planting within seven years, and the construction of a processing plant within fifteen years.13 ' By January of
1988, Coca-Cola had put its plans to plant citrus on "indefinite hold,"
and was determined to sell 96,000 acres, and give away an additional
50,000 acres. 1 2 Other growers have faced similar roadblocks to Caribbean Basin citrus production, with reports of problems ranging from
the lack of supportive technology in the region to a sluggish governmental bureaucracy that brings action to a halt.H
Although there is no danger of frost, labor costs are low and land
relatively inexpensive. More than warm weather, cheap labor, and
land are required to make citrus production cost competitive. Technological innovations in citrus production must be imported, and expansion
in production and processing capacity may be limited. Internal transportation facilities tend to be inadequate, and transportation from the
region to the United States must be factored into the cost. Unlike
the broad acreage available for planting in Florida and Brazil, the
land in Central American countries is largely mountainous or
swampy. 13 Excessive rainfall in the region makes production of high
quality Brix and sugar acid ratio for orange concentrate difficult, and
other growing problems include excessive weed growth, plant disease
and lack of insect control.'3 The Florida Department of Citrus concludes that while the competition from the Caribbean region does not
pose a real present threat, the potentiality of increased plantings and
future production in the wake of a possible expansion of the Act should
not be ignored.
VI.

PROTECTION AGAINST IMPORTS

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Florida legislature has acted
to protect the growing Florida citrus industry from the effects of

130. Brown, Coca-Cola Plans Citrus Venture in CentralAmerica, 57 FEEDSTUFFS 4 (Dec.
2, 1985).
131. Id.
132. Coca-Cola Plans to Sell its Acreage in Belize, J. COM., Jan. 20, 1988, at 4A, col. 1.
133. Unpublished introductory comments of Dr. William Grierson at the Florida State
Horticultural Society Meeting, Tampa, November 1985, as reported by grower William Mathews
in telephone interview (June 28, 1988).
134.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE AND THE

FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY,

135.

supra note 126, at 30.

Id. at 31.
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disease, sale of immature fruit, use of harmful pesticides, and
freezes. 136Considering this past history of regulation for consumer and
industry protection, it is not surprising that the industry has reacted
against foreign imports in various ways calculated to maintain the
37
image of Florida as the citrus state with the best citrus products. 1
While protection of the Florida citrus industry against future imports
of Brazilian citrus concentrate was dismissed by the Florida Citrus
Commission as unneeded in 1968, by 1976 the growing threat posed
by Brazil was starting to be taken seriously. 13 Beginning in the early
1980's, the industry, represented by the grower cooperative association
Florida Citrus Mutual, moved to combat foreign competition by successfully seeking import relief under United States trade laws. In
addition, Florida has imposed taxes on imported citrus products,
created new programs to help guarantee to the consumer that the
purchased juice is high quality, or 100 percent Floridian, initiated a
European Three Party Program to promote the consumption of Florida
citrus products in Europe, and supported federal government requirements 'that imported agricultural products be subject to the same
'
environmental and health regulations as U.S. products."139
When considering the Florida citrus industry, care must be taken
to differentiate between the various constituencies since the needs
and interests of the growers, the processors, who extract and blend
the juice, and the reconstituters, who blend and water the concentrate
and package the juice for retail sale, often differ considerably. Many
times these roles are combined; for example, companies like American
Agronomics Corporation, based in Tampa, grow and process their own
fruit, avoiding the middleman."' When Florida orange products are
in short supply, as they were during the early to mid 1980's, or prices
are high, processors and reconstituters look elsewhere - largely to
Brazil - for lower priced oranges and concentrate.14 1 Lower priced

136. See supra notes 17-35, and accompanying text.
137. A recent Florida Citrus Commission news release states: "Florida citrus is juicier and
sweeter than citrus grown in other regions because of Florida's warm climate, soil conditions
and plentiful rainfall." FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, NEWS RELEASE (Mar., 1988).
138. Compare a 1968 report to the Florida Citrus Commission: "Foreign imports [of frozen
concentrated orange juice] have not adversely affected the Florida citrus economy" with Citrus
Commission Chairman Danforth K. Richardson's comments in 1976: "I think growers should be
aware of [the threat of Brazilian fruit] and give it some thought." FIRST FIFTY YEARS, supra
note 12, at 185, 280.
139. McKowN TESTIMONY, supra note 16, at 7.
140. Louis, Squeezing Gold Out of Oranges, FORTUNE, Jan. 26, 1981, at 78.
141. Berman, Orange Crush, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1986, at 49.
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Brazilian imports can hurt those who grow oranges or extract juice;
but for those who blend juice for retail sale, and for United States'
consumers, the cheaper imports are financially beneficial. '2 This relationship between Florida processors and Brazilian exporters was one
factor that made it impossible for Vice Chairperson of the United
States International Trade Commission, Anne Brunsdale, who dissented in the issuance of an anti-dumping order against Brazil in 1987,
to find that the industry as a whole had been materially injured or
threatened with material injury by reason of Brazilian exports of frozen
concentrate.'" Not surprisingly, responses to questionnaires sent out
by the United States International Trade Commission regarding support for the anti-dumping petition showed greater support from growers than from extractor-processors. 1" This love-hate relationship between the various components of the Florida citrus industry and Brazilian exporters complicates the issue of industry protection and control.
The goal has not been to stop imports completely, but to regulate
their flow so that they are available only when needed as supplements
45
to the Florida supply.'

142. Executive Vice President of Florida Citrus Mutual, Bobby McKown, stated:
We do not ignore the benefits to U.S. consumers of the availability of the Brazilian
supplies. Freeze-induced U.S. shortfalls can be met by Brazilian bulk exports,
which are sold both directly to U.S. reconstituters for production of retail orange
juice products, or to U.S. processors for blending with Florida concentrated juice.
However, the influx of this large and readily available supply of Brazilian bulk
juice, at prices much lower than those which normally prevail during times of
freeze induced shortages, has drastically reduced returns to growers.
McKOWN TESTIMONY, supra note 16, at 3.
143. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 77-78. Chairperson Brunsdale stated:
There is substantial evidence that the overall health of the broader domestic orange
juice business is highly dependent on imported Brazilian frozen concentrated orange
juice, the dumped product under investigation. As a consequence, many (if not all)
of the largest producers of juice derived from U.S.-grown oranges import significant
amounts of Brazilian orange juice."
Id. at 77.
144. Id. at R-21, R-26. Compare Table 4 at R-21 (growers' positions regarding the petition)
with Table 8 at R-26 (extractor-processors' positions).
145. In his 1982 testimony before the International Trade Court investigating Brazilian
subsidies of orange juice concentrate, Dan L. Gunter, Executive Director of the Florida Department of Citrus Department Staff, stated: "The U.S. and Florida import record clearly indicates
that FCOJ imports have been used to supply the domestic market with no real increases in
consumer price. The Florida industry is not attempting to stop FCOJ imports into the U.S."
Statement of Dan L. Gunter, Hearing in Connection with ITC Investigation of Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil [Investigation No. 701TA-184 (Final)] (June 17, 1983).
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A.

Federal and State Protective and Regulatory Devices

The federal government and the state of Florida have a wide array
of mechanisms that have been used with varying degrees of success
to fend off unwelcome imports of concentrate. The United States imposes a tariff on imported frozen concentrated orange juice of thirtyfive cents per gallon (approximately thirty-four cents per pound solid)
for all countries receiving the most-favored-nation rates, including
Mexico and Brazil.146 As discussed previously, beneficiaries of the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act can export certain goods,
including citrus products, duty free.' 4 7 On top of the thirty-five cent
tariff, Florida exacts a three cents per pound advertising tax on imports.'14 This so-called "Florida equalization tax" leads many Brazilian
exporters to simply by-pass Florida and its tax by shipping to northern
United States ports, thereby taking advantage of lower transportation
49
costs to northern and mid-western states.'
Concentrate that is prepared through reconstituting, blending or
packaging in the United States must meet Federal Food and Drug
Administration Standards of Indemnity, and on January 1, 1986, the
United States Customs Service began requiring foreign origin labels
on all frozen and concentrated orange juice sold in the United States. 150
Florida's standards are even more rigorous than those of the Food
and Drug Administration, with the Florida Citrus Code requiring
minimum maturity,,-" color 52 and taste'63 standards that the FDA does
not. Florida's Produce Labeling Act of 1979' 5' requires that "any fresh
fruit or vegetable" produced outside of the United States for sale in
Florida be individually and indelibly stamped with the place of origin.
Similarly, Florida Statute section 601.98 of the Florida Citrus Code
makes it unlawful to misrepresent foreign imported citrus or citrus
products as Florida grown and processed.

146.
147.
148.

Tariff Schedules of the United States, item 165.29, column 1.
See supra notes 111-112, and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. § 601.155 (1987).

149. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FRUIT SITUATION AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 54 (July, 1987). See also FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, REPORT No.
88-4 (Mar. 22, 1988) (showing the increase in use of northern ports for United States' imports

of frozen concentrated orange juice between 1986 and 1987).
150.

Labeling Origin of Orange Juice, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at D2, col. 3.

151. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 601.16 (1987).
152. Id. § 601.26.
153.
154.

Id. § 601.9909(5).
Id. § 504.011-.014.
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Two recent state programs aimed at promoting Florida juice are
the Florida Seal of Approval and the Florida Sunshine Tree.1 - The
Seal of Approval may only be displayed on packaged orange juice that
meets established Florida standards; the Florida Sunshine Tree goes
one step further, identifying 100 percent Florida grown and processed
orange and grapefruit juice. To display either symbol, products must
be tested periodically and licensed by the Florida Department of Citrus. In the 1986-87 Annual Report of the FloridaCitrus Commission,
the Commission announced that the Seal of Approval was carried by
82 percent of all retail orange juice sales as of May, 1987, and that
there was a 130 percent increase in licenses issued under the Florida
1
Sunshine Tree program. M
In an early move to increase exports by developing citrus markets
in Europe through advertising and other promotional means, the
Florida Department of Citrus initiated the European Three-Party Program in 1966.157 Today, when competition for overseas markets is
keen, and Brazilian exported citrus products to Europe were up 76.9
percent in 1987,5 this program has become potentially more important
than it was twenty years ago. Shipments of citrus products to the
twelve participating countriess 9 and promotional activites are supported by the Florida Department of Citrus, the Foreign Agricultural
Service and individual distributors. 60 The Department of Citrus reported the success of this program despite a shipment decline in the
early 1980's due to freezes and Brazilian competition.
B.

United States Trade Law

Increasingly, import relief from what citrus growers have termed
unfair trading practices has been sought through the United States
International Trade Commission under trade remedy law.161 In 1983,
155. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, THE FLORIDA CITRUS COMMISSION (Department of Citrus pamphlet).
156. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, 1986-87 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FLORIDA
CITRUS COMMISSION 4, 9 (1987).

157. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS EUROPEAN
THREE-PARTY PROGRAM EVALUATION (Mar. 18, 1981).
158. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS, OUTLOOK UPDATE, 1986-1987 SEASON 4 (Apr.
22, 1987).
159. The 12 countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF CITRUS, EUROPEAN THREE-PARTY PROGRAM 1 (Nov., 1984).

160.
161.

Id.
The five main United States' unfair trade and relief actions that are available include:
1. Subtitle B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (added by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979), 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976) ("anti-dumping" actions).
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Florida Citrus Mutual succeeded in a countervailing duty action against
Brazil when the International Trade Commission determined pursuant
to section 751(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 that subsidies being paid
by the Brazilian government to growers, producers and exporters of
frozen concentrated orange juice were threatening the United States
citrus industry with a material injury.162 Programs found to confer
subsidies included preferential financing and income tax exemption for
export earnings.,- On February 24, 1983, Brazil signed a suspension
agreement with the United States Department of Commerce, the
terms of which required Brazil to offset the amount of the net subsidy
by an export tax. The International Trade Commission suspended its
investigation after the agreement was signed, but in 1984 the investigation was reopened at the request of three Brazilian producers and
exporters of frozen concentrated orange juice. The petitioners wanted
a review of the 1983 determination in light of changed circumstances,
and a modification or revocation of the suspension agreement. In its
final determination in December of 1984, the International Trade Commission determined that the suspension agreement must remain unaltered to prevent an industry in the United States from being
16
threatened with material injury. '
In May of 1986, Florida Citrus Mutual once again moved against
Brazilian exporters by filing an anti-dumping action pursuant to section
735(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 alleging that imports of frozen concentrated orange juice were being sold in the United States at less than
fair value, thereby materially injuring or threatening with a material
injury a United States industry. 165 In October of 1986, the Department
of Commerce determined dumping margins on the imports to be 8.54
percent, but by March of 1987, the Department had lowered its esti-

2. Subtitle A of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (added by the Trade
Agreement Act of 1979), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (1976). Section 303 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). Section 751(b) of the Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1976) ("countervailing duty" actions).
3. Section 201(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (1976). Section
406(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a) (1976) ("escape clause" actions).
4. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (amended by the Trade Act of 1974),
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) ("Unfair Methods of Competition in Import Trade").
5. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (amended by the Trade Act of 1979),
19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976) ("Presidential Action Against Unjustifiable Foreign Trade
Practice" actions).
162. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 11, at R-2.
163. 48 Fed. Reg. 25,245 (June 6, 1983).
164. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 11, at R-2.
165. Id. at R-1.
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mate substantially to 1.96 percent. 16 In April, the International Trade
Commission finalized the 1.96 percent duty, a figure so low that President of the Brazilian Sao Paulo Citrus Growers Association, Oswaldo
Veloci, stated "[i]t will have virtually no impact. ' ' 167
In an attempt to end unfair trade practices preventing access to
Japanese markets, Florida Citrus Mutual, the Florida Citrus Packers,
the Florida Citrus Processors Association, the Florida Department of
Citrus, and the Indian River Citrus League filed a petition in May of
1988 under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against Japanese
import restrictions on United States orange products. '6A section 301
proceeding gives the President complete discretion in taking action to
enforce the rights of the United States under trade agreements or to
work towards eliminating the alleged unfair practices. Japanese citrus
import quota practices were the subject of unsuccessful talks between
United States and Japanese officials for months before the petition
was filed. Acceptance of the petition has been granted, and the President must determine what action, if any, will be taken.
C.

CaribbeanBasin Initiative Relief

Under section 213(f) of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act, fast-track relief for "perishable products" is provided for those
filing a petition with the International Trade Commission pursuant to
section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. "Perishable products" include
fresh fruit 169 and concentrated citrus fruit juice. 170 To obtain emergency
relief, the International Trade Commission must determine within
fourteen days of the filing of the petition that increased imports have
resulted in serious injury or a threat of serious injury, and must
recommend import relief to the President. 171 Within seven days after
receiving the recommendation, the President either issues a proclamation withdrawing the duty-free treatment afforded by the Act, or
publishes a notice of his determination not to take emergency action.172
In this way, duty-free treatment can be eliminated, and most-favorednation status restored, within twenty-one days.
166. U.S. Cuts Price on Unfair Pricing of Brazilian Juice, Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1987, at
A50, col. 1.
167. Whitefield, supra note 52. See also Bruce, Brazilians Cheer U.S. Citrus Ruling, J.
Com., Mar. 12, 1987, at 3A, col. 5.
168. USTR Yeutter Accepts FloridaCitrus Industry Section 301 Petition Against Japanese
Quotas, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. 788 (June 1, 1988).
169. CB1, supra note 109, § 213(f)(5)(D).
170. Id. § 213(f)(5)(F).
171. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
172. CB1, supra note 109, § 213(f)(3).
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VII.

CONCLUSION

Federal and state regulation of the Florida citrus industry to protect United States consumers and the industry itself has been evident
throughout the industry's history. Foreign imports of frozen concentrated orange juice have become an increasing threat since Brazil
entered the market in 1962. Recent freezes and canker disease in
Florida led to widespread financial difficulties in the citrus industry,
allowing Brazilian exporters to penetrate United States and European
markets to a substantial degree.
The unique nature of the industry, consisting of growers who are
hurt in the short term by the imported concentrate and processors
who seek out the lower-priced foreign concentrate when Florida
supplies are difficult to procure or priced out of reach, has complicated
the issue of industry protection and control. Protection against the
influx of unwanted imports, imports that are not merely supplementary
to the Florida supply but tend to supplant it, has come in many forms:
federal tariffs, the Florida "equalization tax," Florida programs
created to promote the consumption of Florida-grown or Florida-processed juice, federal and state labeling requirements, and relief under
United States trade law. As orange supplies increase, both Brazil and
Florida will continue to reach out to new markets for the lucrative
profits that flow from the consumption of citrus juice.
Margaret S. Lyon
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